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Abstract
This thesis examines the labor market effects of incomplete information about workers’
own job-finding process and best occupations fitting to them. Search outcomes convey
information about workers’ job finding abilities and appropriate occupations suited to
them, and workers use this information to infer their types. This learning process
generates endogenous heterogeneity in occupational choices and workers beliefs. Our
theory explains how unemployment can affect labor market decisions including the oc-
cupational choices. Characterization results in a simple value function with reservation
level of prior belief property that is similar to reservation wage property. Some interest-
ing facts about both micro and macro data are identified and our model’s explanation of
these facts is discussed. In particular, our characterization gives rational for why work-
ers with less experience in searching have (1) longer unemployment duration and (2)
higher probability of changing occupation by reemployment, and (3) why shifts in Bev-
eridge curve may be observed. Theory can also be used to (4) explain the discouraged
worker phenomenon.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
IF WORKERS have incomplete information about their job search and matching pro-
cess such as their ability to find a job and the best occupation suitable for them, search
outcomes brings important information. Even the same type of workers may have dif-
ferences in search outcomes initially caused by luck, which bring differences in their
beliefs about their abilities and their best-suited occupation. Differences in beliefs fur-
ther affect their future search decisions and occupational choices, which eventually may
have a huge effect on wage rate, employment rates and unemployment duration.
Consider two workers, who have the same skill set, same education etc. One worker is
working at the same firm for ten years and never has been separated, the other worker
has separated and had to search for a job every year for ten years trying different
occupations. The second worker obviously is more experienced on searching for a job,
and therefore has a better understanding about his/her job finding ability and about
which occupation he can find a job more easily. He may be called as a ‘bird in the air’.
First worker on the other hand is less experienced on searching for a job. He may not
have a good understanding in which occupation he can find a job more easily. He may
1
2be called as a ‘fish out of water’. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge there
is not a data source which provides either a full search history or a belief history of
workers for US economy. Nevertheless, the CPS ‘Displaced Worker, Employee Tenure,
and Occupational Mobility Supplement’ (to be called as Displaced worker supplement
from now on) includes data on displaced worker such as their previous and current
occupations, job tenures and wage rates. In this paper, previous job tenure of displaced
workers will be used as a proxy in order to identify these two different group of workers.
Displaced workers with longer previous job tenures are assumed to be more likely in the
first group, displaced workers with short previous job tenure are assumed to be more
likely in the second group. Validity of this as a good proxy will be discussed further in
the data motivation section. Our model in this paper will be a base to state actually that
displaced workers with longer previous job tenure are more likely to be inexperienced
workers in searching compared to same age displaced workers with shorter previous job
tenure.
Data on Displaced worker supplement have the following stark features: First, com-
pared to displaced workers with shorter previous job tenures, the displaced workers
with longer tenures in previous job are more likely to have (1) longer unemployment
durations, and (2) different reemployment occupations. Second, during the current re-
cession, (3) the ratio of displaced workers with longer past tenure to displaced worker
with shorter past tenure has been increased, which results in longer average unemploy-
ment duration.
Current aggregate data on the labor market suggests that the current recession is
different from the previous periods. Firstly, there is a (4)higher number of discouraged
workers during the current recession. The discrepancy between the U4 unemployment
3rate and the U3 unemployment rate1 has been increased from 0.2 (historical average)
to 0.6 percent (average during current recession), which amounts to around 1.2 million
discouraged worker throughout US. Secondly, during the current recession (5) average
unemployment duration increases significantly. Finally, the (6) Beveridge curve, an
empirical relation between vacancy and unemployment rates, does not seem to hold
during the current recession whereas it was more pronounced in previous periods. After
2008, unemployment rate have been higher than the Beveridge curve suggests, which
may be an indication of a shift.
This paper will attempt to give a possible explanation for these facts. In our model,
workers are heterogeneous in their job finding ability and their suitability for certain
occupations. Because workers have incomplete information about their types, they do
not precisely know their job finding abilities and their best-suited occupations. They
learn about their types from observing search outcomes. Firms, which are subject to
free entry condition, will post vacancies at a cost and commit to pay a wage rate if a
successful match occurs. Characterization of an equilibrium with these features gives
some qualitative explanation in the line with the facts presented beforehand. Firstly,
people with worse priors about their types (in the sense that belief is far away from
the actual type) direct their search on a job in a less suitable occupation. Since job
finding probabilities depend on actual type of agents and on suitability of occupation
for the agent, search outcomes will give valuable information to the workers about
directing themselves to more suitable occupations. Because this learning process takes
time with possible occupation change, the people with less experience in searching stay
1 U3 is the conventional unemployment rate whereas the U4 includes the discouraged workers to
calculation. Beaure of Labor Statistics give definition of them as:
U3 =
# of unemployed
# of Labor force
, U4 =
# of unemployed +# of Discouraged
# of Labor force +# of Discouraged
4unemployed longer and are more likely to change occupation. This learning process
through search gives a rationale for the facts from the Displaced worker supplement.
Secondly, if the amount of workers with worse priors in the unemployment pool increases,
the average unemployment duration also increases and the observed unemployment-
vacancy relation shifts as seen in the data. This gives a rationale for some aggregate
data facts. Finally, with costly search extension to our main model, workers, whose
prior get worse and worse because of the search outcomes, might decide not to search
any longer but to stay out of the labor force becoming discouraged workers.
Our model is a directed search model in the spirit of Acemoglu and Shimer (1999).
In Burdett and Vishwanath (1988) and Bikhchandani and Sharma (1996), workers also
learn during the search process, but workers learn about unknown common distribution
of matching process whereas in our paper workers learn about their own types. In
Jovanovic (1979), a matched worker-firm pair draws an unobservable match quality
from a known distribution. Through noisy signals which is correlated by match quality,
both workers and firms learn about the actual match quality and decide whether to
continue match. In all these papers, workers are homogeneous and learning is about an
unobservable draw from a known distribution. In our paper, workers are heterogeneous
in terms of their ability to find a job and the their best suited occupation. Moreover,
unlike those papers workers learn about their own type by observing search outcomes.
Model in this paper is closely related to Gonzalez and Shi (2010) . Our model
also is a competitive search model with different types of workers with different job
finding probabilities. The productive technology of search effort is also very similar.
However, in Gonzalez and Shi (2010) the workers do not have any occupational choice;
all the jobs are homogeneous in terms of productivity and matching probability of same
type of workers. Our model will assume that the jobs are differentiated, therefore they
5can be interpreted as different occupations. Hence, different than Gonzalez and Shi
(2010) our value function will have an endogenous reservation prior belief property. Our
model is also related with Falk et al. (2006), which also uses different types of workers
with different job finding probabilities and giving a motivation for discouraged worker
phenomenon. However, they have homogeneous jobs also; therefore, they cannot address
the occupational choices addressed in our paper. Moreover, they used a continuous time
approach and random search with Nash bargaining whereas our model is a discrete time
competitive search model.
In Papageorgiou (2010), both workers and jobs are heterogeneous. Jobs are divided
among different occupations and workers divided into different unobservable types as
in our paper. Workers also learn about their types through observing outcomes as in
our paper. However, in Papageorgiou (2010) workers infer about their types observ-
ing noisy signal of their productivity during employment and decide on attempting to
change occupation. Our model focus on informativeness of search outcomes rather than
informativeness of productivity of a worker in certain occupation. Therefore the learning
process is very different.
The paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, Chapter 2 discusses
data motivation. Chapter 3 presents the model. Chapter 4 defines the equilibrium,
characterizes it and gives an extension to model in order to explain discouraged worker
notion. Chapter 5 concludes.
Chapter 2
Data Motivation
We have used two different data sources. First is CPS’s Displaced worker supplement.
Second is aggregate data obtained from the BLS.
Displaced worker supplement is conducted every two years in Januaries, which asks
additional questions to the displaced workers . Displaced workers in this supplement
are those who involuntarily separated from their jobs during the past three years before
survey date by (i) mass layoff, (ii) plant closure or (iii) abolishment of their position1
rather than because of individual job performance. Therefore supplement data has
its own limitations: First, workers are surveyed just once, providing information on
one post-displacement data, rather than about their full history of experiences over
time. So it is not possible to obtain panel data from this survey. Second, it does not
include all unemployment pool but only displaced workers; hence, voluntary quits and
fires by case are not sampled. However, it also has one main advantage; it is a huge
survey of around 150,000 individuals who are weighted to represent US workforce. We
1 It means position is abolished and no new employee will take place of him after his/her separation.
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7have taken six supplements2 to obtain data on displaced workers from 1999 to 2012,
including their demographic information, total unemployment duration, previous and
current occupations, previous and current job tenures,and previous and current wage
rates etc.
As stated beforehand, we are trying to identify the workers who are more experi-
enced in search. If search provides some valuable information about job finding ability
and suitability of their skills to find a job in certain occupations, then people with more
experience are more likely to realize their abilities and more likely to pick suitable oc-
cupation to search for. Because of that, experienced workers in searching would find
a job more easily and their total unemployment duration would be lower compared to
inexperienced one. Unfortunately, Displaced worker supplement does not include full
search experience of the workers. Nonetheless, it includes previous job tenure of dis-
placed workers, and this information will be used as a proxy for total search experience.
It will be assumed that people who had to search for a job e.g. one years ago and
now have to search again will be regarded as more likely to be more experienced in
searching than people who had to search for a job ten years ago and now have to search
again. Validity of the data motivation depends on whether this is a good proxy for
overall search experience. Our model will not include imperfectness in recalling learn-
ing experience or unobservable aggregate/idiosyncratic fluctuations or trends in labor
market. However, if people cannot recall their experience from far past perfectly or if
the conditions of the current labor market has changed, farther the previous job search
experience lesser the information content of it. Hence a worker who had search experi-
ence one year ago will remember or will be able to ‘use’ his/her experience from that
search much better than a worker who had the same search experience ten years ago and
2 Displaced worker supplements 2002, 2004,2006,2008, 2010 and 2012
8Table 2.1: Basic Facts from micro data: the displaced workers with longer tenures in previous job are
more likely to have (1) longer unemployment durations, and (2) different reemployment occupations
1 Change of Occupation 2 Unemployment Duration
Previous tenure Change No Change Previous tenure Short (<18 w) Long (> 8 y)
Short (≤8 y) 43% 57% Short (≤8 y) 63% 37%
Long (> 8 y) 48% 52% Long( > 18 w) 52% 48%
never searched again. If this is actually the case, the most current previous job search
process will be more informative than the other previous experience and therefore the
proxy mentioned here is actually a good one. Moreover, if anything else is constant,
among the same age displaced workers, workers who have longer tenures on his previous
job have a shorter time span for experimenting (i.e. off-the-job-searching) compared to
displaced workers who have shorter previous job tenure on average. Of course, we do not
have on-the-job search activities, intensity of the searches or other past search efforts,
therefore our proxy is not the best one but currently the only available one to us for now.
Table 2.13 summarizes the main findings in this analysis. We will present only rele-
vant statistics in this section; detailed data work can be seen in Appendix-Data section.
3 For occupations two digit occupation codes of CPS classification has been chosen. Change in
occupation means that if displaced worker is reemployed, his/her new occupation is different than his
previous occupation in two digit codes. Long (short) tenure means that the displaced worker has worked
for 9 years or more (8 years or less) in his/her previous job before displacement. Long (short) unem-
ployment duration means that it takes more (strictly less) than 18 weeks to find a new job. Arranged
displacements are disregarded, i.e. workers who did not stayed unemployed after displacement but im-
mediately found job are taken as arranged displacement and were not included in the dataset.These
summary statistics are for displaced workers who are male, white, aged between 35 and 45, having
educational attainment of at least high school, and having same eligibility for unemployment insurance.
There are around 3,100 observations in this group. Not all the workers have all relevant data like previ-
ous and/or current tenure duration. The table includes observations whenever relevant data exists. We
have also looked at the other group of employees with respect to other demographic and educational
characteristics. The statistics are not changing qualitatively. We have also done robustness check on
the specification of long and short durations and its cut-off points. Again, the results does not change
qualitatively. We tried to control for industries and occupations but small sample sizes directs us away
from that approach
9All figures in Table 2.1 are in terms of row percentage, e.g. in first mini-table, 43%
implies that forty three percent of all workers with short previous tenure duration have
changed their occupation upon reemployment and 57% of workers with short previous
tenure duration have not changed occupation upon reemployment. Following observa-
tions from the Table 2.1 worth noting. First, from first mini-table of Table 2.1, upon
re-employment new occupation of displaced workers with longer previous job tenure
is more likely to be different than their previous occupation compared to displaced
worker with shorter previous job tenure. 48% of displaced workers with long previous
job tenure change occupation after re-employment whereas only 43% displaced workers
with short previous job tenure change occupation after re-employment. Second, from
second mini-table of Table 2.1, displaced workers with longer tenure in his previous job
before displacement have longer unemployment durations. 48% of displaced workers
with long previous job tenure have long unemployment durations whereas only 37%
displaced workers with short previous job tenure have long unemployment durations.
These two findings may appear to be a puzzle if one considers standard occupation spe-
cific human capital approach. Under standard human capital approach, it is assumed
that if a person stayed longer in his previous occupation, he would obtain more occu-
pation specific human capital. Therefore, one would expect a displaced worker with
longer previous job tenure to find a job in his previous occupation once re-employed.
Moreover, if everything else is same (including reservation wage, wealth and other types
of human capital), the person with higher occupation specific human capital is expected
to find a job easier and in shorter duration. Our hypothesis, namely search outcomes
provide information about job finding ability and about suitability of a particular oc-
cupation to a particular worker, give a rationale to solve this puzzle between data facts
and standard human capital approach.
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Figure 2.1: Average and median unemployment duration
Current aggregate data on labor market suggests that the current recession is dif-
ferent than the previous time periods. Firstly, there is a higher number of discouraged
workers during current recession. Figure 2.2 shows U4 and U3 unemployment rates (see
footnote 1). The discrepancy between U4 unemployment rate and U3 unemployment
rate has been increased from 0.2 (historical average) to 0.6 percent (average during cur-
rent recession), which amounts to around 1.2 million discouraged worker throughout US.
Secondly, during the current recession average unemployment duration increases signif-
icantly. Figure 2.1 shows the average and median unemployment duration. Average
unemployment duration has been increase from around 17 weeks of historical average
to around 28 weeks during recession.
Finally, the empirical relation between vacancy rate and unemployment rate, namely
Beveridge curve, does not seem to hold during current recession whereas it was more
pronounced in previous periods. Figure 2.3 shows that unemployment rate is higher
than the Beveridge curve suggests for the vacancy rate during current recession.
11
Figure 2.2: Different definitions of UE and Role of Discouraged Workers
In the next chapter we will provide a model which will be used to account for these
facts. This model also will be a candidate to explain the puzzle between these data
facts and standard human capital approach.
12
Figure 2.3: Shift in Beveridge Curve
Chapter 3
Model
3.1 Environment
There is a unit measure of infinitely-living workers which is divided to employed and
unemployed (and out-of-labor force with the extension discussed in Chapter 4). Measure
of firms in each occupation will be determined endogenously by free entry. All the agents
are risk neutral and discount the future at a rate r > 0. Employed workers produces
an amount of homogeneous goods according to their occupation until a separation or
exit shock hits the worker. Unemployed worker searches for a job and receives a utility
of b > 0 in each period which constitutes leisure benefit of being unemployed and/or
unemployment benefit.
As in Gonzalez and Shi (2010), each worker has an unknown permanent ability of
i, which is either high h or low l, and has an associated productivity parameter σh and
σl respectively, where σh ,σl ∈ (0, 1) and σh ≥ σl . Each new worker in the market
has ability i with probability pi ∈ (0, 1), where ph = 1 − pl. There are two different
occupations j either good g or bad b and associated productivity parameters µg and
13
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µb, where µg, µb ∈ (0, 1), µb = 1 − µg and µg > µb. We will see that productivity
of employed workers will not differ according to type of workers, on the other hand
occupation g has better prospects for type h unemployed workers and occupation b has
better prospects for type l unemployed workers in terms of finding a job. Ability and
occupation determines a worker’s search productivity as follows. First, a worker picks
either occupation g or b and firms decide to open a vacancy position. Second, standard
randomized matching occurs between unemployed workers and vacancy positions. So
far, everything is very conventional as in directed search and matching model. Then
following unconventional productivity assignment makes finding a job in distinct occu-
pations different for distinct types of unemployed workers. Nature (which can see the
type of the worker and assigns productivities accordingly) moves and assign a produc-
tivity to a matched worker according to his type and the occupation he chooses. If a
worker is applying for occupation g, productivity of worker of type h will be yg > 0
with probability σhµg and y
′ < 0 with probability 1 − σhµg (otherwise); productivity
of worker of type l will be yg > 0 with probability σl(1 − µg and y′ < 0 otherwise.
In market b, a worker with type h will have a productivity of yb > 0 with probabil-
ity σhµb) and y
′ < 0 otherwise; a worker of type l will have a productivity of yb > 0
with probability σl(1− µb) and y′ < 0 otherwise. That is productivity of a (employed)
worker is occupation specific and it is not depend type of the worker. Worker meets
randomly drawn firm which offers a job in that occupation. Both firm and worker
can see the productivity but not the type of the worker. Similar to Gonzalez and Shi
(2010) we will call σµ components as productive units. High ability workers are more
likely to be productive than a low-ability worker in occupation h. Obviously, a firm
will hire the worker only if worker has positive productivity. Note that every employed
15
worker in occupation g has a productivity yg, and every employed worker in occupa-
tion l has a productivity yl. I will also assume different separation shock for different
occupations: an employed worker in occupation g has a probability δg > 0 to separate
and join unemployed pool and an employed worker in occupation b has a probability
δb > 0 to separate. Hence occupations g and b are differentiated by their prospects of
job finding probability for different types of unemployed workers, by total product pro-
duced by each worker and by their separation probability. Note that in order to focus
on learning aspects of only search outcomes of unemployed workers rather than of the
job productivity signal of employed workers, this setup forces every employed worker
in a certain occupation (even if workers are different types of workers) produces same
amount of product. By this way we have clearly seperated informativeness of search
outcomes from informativeness of on-the job productivity. This study will only focus
on informativeness of search outcomes and should be seen as a complementary research
rather than a substitutes to the studies (e.g. Javonovic 1979) about informativeness of
on-the-job productivity. Nevertheless, please note that we have used similar concepts
in different context, therefore there remains a possibility of confusing these concepts
if one is more familiar with studies about informativeness of on-the-job productivity.
We suggest that one should make himself clearly understand productive technology of
search in our model to clearly perceive these concepts in our context.
As mentioned in Gonzalez and Shi (2010), this formulation of worker’s ability to find
a job can be interpreted in the context of worker and firm specific skill bundle of Lazear
(2009). In this context, different firms or different occupations require different skill
bundles and workers are heterogeneous in terms of their skill bundles. A firm reviews
the worker in order to understand whether his/her skill bundle would fit the firm. In
our study, we assume that high type workers have a higher probability to fit the firm
16
which offer a job with occupation g compared to low type workers. Likely, low types
have a higher probability to fit a firm offering occupation b than to fit a firm offering
an occupation g.
Learning will take place once an unemployed worker searches for a job. Since after a
long history the worker would be able to learn his/her actual ability, we will assume an
exit shock hits him to rule out this uninteresting case. Therefore, there is a probability
of ψ > 0 that a person whether employed or unemployed dies.
We will use the search and matching approach as follows: The number of matches
is given by a matching function F : R2 → R. We will use the index1 x, rate of a match
occurs, as the argument of all the following functions. v(x) denotes total measure of
vacancies created in the economy, whereas u(x) denotes total measure of unemployed
workers, just the sum of the measure of unemployment workers of each type.
A function F (u(x), v(x)) gives the number of matches in the economy. Therefore
matching rate index x is
x =
F (u (x) , v (x))
u (x)
Using matching function, ordinary definitions in competitive search model follows:
the matching probability of a vacancy in economy is F/v =x/λ(x), where λ(x) ≡
v(x)/u(x) is the tightness in the labor market. As in Gonzalez and Shi (2010), we
will assume the following standard assumptions for the matching function:
Assumption I:(Regularity conditions of matching function) Function F is such
that (i) strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice differentiable in each argument;
(ii) F is linearly homogeneous; (iii) F (1, 0) = 0,F (1,∞) ≥ 1/aH , and x/λ(x) ≤ 1 for all
1 Tightness, λ, can also equivalently be used as argument. There is not too much difference between
use of λ or x. Although in literature λ is used more often, we have used x, because x has been used in
derivations more often in this paper.
17
x ≤ 1/σh.
Remark 1: Since F (1, λ) = x this assumption implies that
∂λ(x)
∂x
>
λ(x)
x
> 0,
∂2λ(x)
∂x2
> 0 for all x ∈ (0, 1/ah) (3.1)
moreover, xλ(x) is strictly decreasing in x.
By these specifications labor market is characterized by a wage level, W (x, j), and
a tightness, λ(x). Every agent in the market takes W (·) and λ( ·) as given. They
will be determined in equilibrium. An unemployed worker’s search decision in each
period is to choose an occupation j and then he applies to lets say a central agency of
matching. A firm set the wage menu {(w(x, j), λ(x)) : j ∈ {g, b}} taken the equilibrium
wage menu, {(W (x, j), λ(x)) : j ∈ {g, b}} as given and commit to pay wage rate w(x, j)
if a productive match on occupation j occurs.
3.2 Value function of firms and free entry
Any firm can post a vacancy in economy after incurring a cost c ∈ (0, yb). If an
occupation j is filled at a wage rate w, value of that filled occupation j to the firm
discounted to the end of previous period is
(1 + r) J jf (w) = yj − w + (1− ψ) (1− δj) J jf (w) (3.2)
Match probability is xλ(x) and continuation value of the match is (1− ψ) J jf (W (x, j)).
Therefore solving J jf from the equation above, value of opening vacancy is
Jv (x) = −c+ x
λ (x)
yj −W (x, j)
Aj
(3.3)
18
where Aj ≡ r+ψ1−ψ + δj is a constant for j ∈ {g, b}. Note that left hand side does not
depend on j, since there should not be any arbitrage for the firm to open a vacancy
in occupation g or occupation b due to free entry. Precisely, Jv (x) and the number of
vacancies,v(x) satisfy Jv (x) ≤ 0 and v(x) ≥ 0 , where the two inequalities hold with
complementary slackness. Thus, if v(x) > 0, the wage rate is
W (x, j) = yj − cAjλ (x) /x (3.4)
for j ∈ {g, b}. By remark 1 wage function has following properties: 1)W ′(x) < 0 2)
xW (x) is strictly concave.
3.3 Learning from search
Workers learn about their types by observing their search outcomes using Bayesian
updating. We will refer to a workers conditional expectation about being a high type
as Ph
2. New born workers entering the market will have a belief of Ph = ph, which is a
common knowledge to every agent in the market.
Lets say that Ph is the prior belief about being a high type. Workers uses Bayesian
updating over search outcomes. Updating will depend on in which particular occupation
they try to find a job and on his/her search outcomes. Let o = 1 indicates that he has
been productive in his current search (find the job) and o = 0 indicates that he has not
been productive (fails to find the job). If a productive match occurs (worker finds a job)
then posterior belief of being high type conditional on worker is searching in occupation
j where the match rate in labor market is x is
2As well as Ph, conditional probability of being low type can also be used as belief.
19
P (h|x, j, o = 1) = P (o = 1|x, j, σh)Ph
P (o = 1|x, j, h)Ph + P (o = 1|x, j, l)Pl
=
σhµjxPh
σhµjxPh + σl (1− µj)xPl =
1
1 +
σl(1−µj)
σhµj
Pl
Ph
(3.5)
Posterior belief of being high type conditional on worker is searching in occupation
j and has not been productive is
P (h|x, j, o = 0) = P (k = 0|x, j, σh)Ph
P (k = 0|x, j, σh)Ph + P (k = 0|x, j, σl)Pl
=
(1− σhµjx)Ph
(1− σhµjxPh) + (1− σl(1− µj)x)Pl
=
1
1 +
1−σl(1−µj)x
1−σhµjx
Pl
Ph
(3.6)
It is informative to compare posterior beliefs P (h|.) with prior beliefs Ph. For that
the multiplier at the dominator just before PlPh is useful. If that multiplier is smaller
than 1 than posterior is higher than prior and vice versa. Note that if search occurs
in occupation h and o = 1, then posterior of being high type is higher then prior since
σl(1−µh)
σhµh
< 1. If search occurs in occupation h and o = 0, then posterior of being high
type is smaller then its prior since 1−σl(1−µh)x1−σhµhx > 1. Moreover, increase on the belief
of being high type with productive match does not depend on the rate x, whereas the
decrease in beliefs with a non-productive match is higher for higher x’s. Because, x
does not affect the likelihood ratio of a match success between the two types, on the
other hand, the fail in matching with a higher rate of job offers in occupation h give a
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stronger signal of being type l.
If the search has occurred for occupation b, then a match will decrease, increase or
not-change the belief of being high type depending on whether σl(1−µb)σhµb > 1,
σl(1−µb)
σhµb
< 1
or σl(1−µb)σhµb = 1, respectively. Again, fail in finding a job will decrease, increase or not-
change the belief of being high type depending on whether σl(1−µb)σhµb < 1 ,
σl(1−µb)
σhµb
> 1
or σl(1−µb)σhµb = 1, respectively. Among this alternatives assuming either
σl(1−µb)
σhµb
> 1 or
σl(1−µb)
σhµb
= 1 is meaningful in the sense that new information (e.g. being accepted by
occupation b) does not take posterior away from correct type of worker on average.
This observation is summarized in assumption II below. Moreover, as a special case
no information content on the search outcome in occupation b will also be analyzed.
The reason is that it may be more enlightening to characterize equilibrium with two
different occupations; one with information content and one without the information
content. In such a characterization, the workers’ behavior towards information con-
tent of occupation, as well as interaction between information content of search and
other labor market variables such as wage rate, unemployment rate and unemployment
duration will be more clear.
Assumption II:(Search give information about true type) σh ≥ σl, µg > µb and
σl (1− µb) ≥ σhµb.
3.4 Workers Value Functions
Consider first a worker with belief Ph of being high type who is employed at wage w in
occupation j in any period. Denote the worker’s value function, discounted to the end
of the previous period, as Je(Ph, w, j).After producing and obtaining the wage w, the
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separation shock forces the worker into unemployment with probability δj depending
on occupation and then, independently, the exit shock forces the worker out of the
market with probability ψ. If the worker remains employed after these two shocks, the
continuation value is Je(Ph, w, j). If the worker is separated from the job but remains in
the market, the continuation value is denoted V (Ph). If the worker is out of the market,
the continuation value is 0. Thus Bellman equation for Je
(1 + r) Je(Ph, w, j) = w + (1− ψ) [(1− δ) Je(Ph, w) + δjV (Ph)]
This yields
Je(Ph, w, j) =
1
Aj
[
w
1− ψ + δjV (Ph)
]
(3.7)
where Aj ≡ r+ψ1−ψ + δj is a constant for j ∈ {g, b}.
Now consider an unemployed worker who enters a period with belief Ph. If he chooses
occupation j, expected probability of finding a job is P (Ph, j, x) where
P (Ph, j, x) = x [Phσhµj + (1− Ph)σl(1− µj)]
= x[CjPh +Dj ] (3.8)
where Cj = (σh + σl)µj − σl and Dj = σl(1− µj) are positive constants.
His belief will be updated by P (h|x, j, o = 1) via equation (3.5) if he finds a job
and by P (h|x, j, o = 0) via equation (3.6) if he/she fails. If he finds a job, his value
function will be max
{
Je
(
P (h|x, j, o = 1),W (x, j)
)
, V (P (h|x, j, o = 1))
}
; if he fails to
find a job, the value function will be V
(
P (h|x, j, o = 0)
)
. His expected return to apply
occupation j excluding the unemployment benefit, is (1− ψ)R(Ph, j;x), where
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R(Ph, j;x) = P (Ph, j;x) max
{
Je
(
P (h|x, j, o = 1),W (x, j)
)
, V (P (h|x, j, o = 1))
}
+(1− P (Ph, x, j))V (P (h|x, j, o = 0))
Since we discounted value functions to the end of previous period, then
(1 + r)V (Ph) = b+ (1− ψ) max
j∈{g,b}
R(Ph, j;x) (3.9)
As in Gonzalez and Shi (2010), we assume that the workers always accept the job
offer in any occupation. In other words,
Je
(
P (h|x, j, o = 1),W (x, j) , j
)
> V
(
P (h|x, j, o = 1)
)
for all Ph ∈ [0, 1] and j ∈ {g, b} (3.10)
Using definition of Je from equation (3.7), this condition is equivalent to
W (x, j) > (r+ψ)V
(
P (h|x, j, o = 1)
)
for all Ph ∈ [0, 1], x ∈ X and j ∈ {g, b} (3.11)
This condition is equivalent to condition (3.12) below. As X is bounded, this con-
dition can be satisfied for sufficiently high productivity yj and sufficiently small unem-
ployment benefit b and cost of opening vacancy c. This is reasonable since equilibrium
wage rate depends positively on productivity yj which in turn make continuation value
of employment higher whereas unemployment benefit b increases continuation value of
staying unemployed.
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Assumption III: ( Reservation wage always met) Assume that productivity in the
market j ∈ {g, b} satisfy that
yj − b
c
> [Aj + σhx] for all x ∈ X (3.12)
There are two reasons for this assumption. First, it is already well known that
the workers will prolong their unemployment duration if their reservation wage has
not been met. However, in this paper, the focus is on the unemployment caused by
learning process of workers. Best way to isolate this type of unemployment is closing
the reservation wage channel. Second reason is a technical one: with the use of this
assumption the value function will be identified further by Theorem 2.
Under Assumption II and Assumption III, we can rewrite expected return function
using definition of Je from equation (3.7)
R (Ph, j;x) = x(CjPh +Dj)
[
1
Aj
W (x, j)
1− ψ +
δj
Aj
V
(
P (h|x, j, o = 1)
)]
+(1− CjPhx−Djx)V
(
P (h|x, j, o = 0)
)
(3.13)
Finally, under Assumption II and III value function is
(1 + r)V (Ph) = b+ (1− ψ)
max
j∈{g,b}
{
x(CjPh +Dj)
[
1
Aj
W (x, j)
1− ψ +
δj
Aj
V
(
P (h|x, j, o = 1)
)]
+(1− CjPhx−Djx)V
(
P (h|x, j, o = 0)
)}
(3.14)
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We use equation (3.14) to characterize equilibrium.
Chapter 4
Definition and characterization of
equilibrium
4.1 Definition of equilibrium
Definition 1. The stationary symmetric equilibrium with learning consists of value
functions (Je, V ; Jf , Jv), worker choices (j), a wage function W (x, j) and a sequence
of beliefs such that
1. (a) The value functions (Je, V ; Jf , Jv) satisfies (3.7) (3.9) ; (3.2) (3.3), respec-
tively
(b) Given the wage function, all workers with same belief Ph use same optimal
strategy (j) j = g (Ph) ∈ Gj (Ph) which solves (3.9)
(c) Bayesian Update: A worker with belief Ph and optimal strategy (j) as in (b)
update his belief with P (h|x, j, o = 1) as in (3.5) if he/she finds a job and
with P (h|x, j, o = 0) as in (3.6) if he/she fails to find a job.
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(d) Free entry: Wage function W (x, j) satisfies (3.4).
(e) Consistency: For labor market, the measure of all vacancies divided by the
measure of unemployed workers is equal to λ(x).
After this general definition of the equilibrium, we will characterize equilibrium
under Assumption I, II and III.
4.2 Some Characterization of the Equilibrium
Theorem 2. (Existence Of Equilibrium) Under Assumptions I and III, there exists an
equilibrium where all matches are accepted.
Proof. Existence of value functions Jf and Jv are very standard and will be omitted here.
One can check e.g. Rogerson et al. (2005) for the arguments. Existence of Je depends
on existence of V . For existence of V, it is almost immediate to check that the right-hand
side of (3.9 ) satisfies the Blackwell sufficiency conditions. Using standard arguments
in Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989), one can show that a unique V exists, which is
positive, bounded and continuous on M . Moreover, the correspondence of maximizers
Gj is non-empty, closed and upper hemicontinuous. Sufficiency of Assumption III for
all matches accepted is little detailed and will be addressed at the appendix.
Although the existence result does not depend on Assumption II, it will help us to
characterize the value function with a reservation prior property.
Theorem 3 (Reservation Belief Property). Under Assumptions I,II and III, there exists
P ∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that all unemployed workers with a belief Ph < P ∗ choses to search in
occupation b and all unemployed workers with a belief Ph > P
∗ choses to search in
occupation g. Value function V (Ph) is (weakly) convex and strictly increasing on [0, 1].
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Proof. Under Assumption II and III, value function is represented by (3.14). Since V
is unique, first argument in max operator at the right hand side is strictly decreasing
on [0,1] whereas second argument is strictly increasing first note that. I will just show
that second argument is strictly increasing on [0,1] (proof of the other argument is very
similar):
Let V be a weakly increasing function, Pha > Phb where Pha, Phb ∈ [0, 1] and gi =
g (Phi) ∈ G(Phi) be particular optimum choices where i ∈ {a, b}. Then
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R(Pha, ga)−R(Phb, gb)
≥ R(Pha, gb)−R(Phb, gb)
≥ x (Dj + CjPha) 1
Ah
[
W (x, h)
1− ψ + δhV (P (Pha, g, 1))
]
+ [1− x (Dj + CjPha)]V (P (Pha, g, 0))
−
{
x (Dj + CjPhb)
1
Ah
[
W (x, h)
1− ψ + δhV (P (Phb, g, 1))
]
+ [1− x (Dj + CjPhb)]V (P (Phb, x, 0))
}
= xDj (Pha − Phb) 1
Ah
W (x, h)
1− ψ + x (Dj + CjPha)
1
Ah
δhV (P (Pha, g)
−x (Dj + CjPhb) 1
A
δhV (P (Phb, g, 1))
+ [1− x (Dj + CjPha)]V (P (Pha, g, 0))− [1− x (Dj + CjPhb)]V (H (Phb, x, 0))
≥ xDj (Pha − Phb) 1
Ah
W (x, h)
1− ψ + x (Dj + CjPha)
1
Ah
δhV (P (Phb, g, 1)
−x (Dj + CjPhb) 1
Ah
δhV (P (Phb, g, 1))
+ [1− x (Dj + CjPha)]V (P (Pb, g, 0))− [1− x (Dj + CjPhb)]V (P (Phb, x, 0))
= xC (Pha − Phb)
[
W (x, h)
Ah (1− ψ) +
δh
Ah
V (P (Phb, g, 1)− V (P (Phb, g, 0))
]
> xC (Pha − Phb) [V (P (Phb, g, 1))− V (P (Phb, g, 0))]
≥ 0
First inequality uses the fact that ga is the maximizer for Pha. Second inequality uses
V (P (Pha, g, 1)) ≥ V (P (Phb, g, 1)) and V (P (Pha, gb, 0)) ≥ V (P (Phb, gb, 0)) . Strict in-
equlaity uses Assumption III which is equivalent to W (x, j) > (r+ψ)V ((P (h|x, j, o =
1)).Last inequality uses the fact that P (Phb, g, o = 1) > P (Phb, g, o = 0) and V is weakly
increasing function.
29
Since first component of max operator is decreasing and second operator is strictly
increasing we have a reservation prior property (Note that we did not restrict P ∗ to be
interior of [0, 1]. For that a relevant bound on yg − yb is sufficient).
Finally, proof of convexity of Value function is similar to proof in Nyarko (1994)
.
4.3 Steady state distributions
Denote eji (Ph) as measure of type-i workers employed in occupation-j with belief Ph
and ui(Ph) as measure of unemployed type-i workers before labor market opens in
a period for i ∈ {h, l} and occupation-j ∈ {g, b}. Probability of new born to be
type i is pi. New workers enter with belief p0 = ph. Let T (p0) be tree of equilib-
rium beliefs generated from p0. Then stationary distributions of workers over beliefs
is
{(
eji (p), ui (p)
)j∈{g,b}
i∈{h,l}
: p ∈ T (p0)
}
Unemployed workers are in 3 groups: Newborns,
UE was E in previous period, UE was UE in previous period,:
1. Newborns: Outflow and inflow from this group is ψpi. Therefore this group is
always stationary
u
(
ip0) = ψpi p ∈ T (p0) i ∈ h, l (4.1)
2. Unemployed - was employed in previous period.
• Outflow:All workers move out from this group.
• Inflow: separate from jobs and survive
• Occupation j: Belief is φ(p) for some p ∈ T (p0)
ui(φ(p)) =
∑
j
(1− ψ)δjeji (φ(p)), p ∈ T (p0) i ∈ H,L (4.2)
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3. Unemployed - was unemployed in previous period
• Occupation j: Belief is n(p) = P (p, x, j, o = 0) for some p ∈ T (p0). Every-
body outflow. Inflow is who survives and fails to find a job
ujH(n(p)) = (1− ψ)[1− σhµhxJ(p)]uH(p), p ∈ T (p0) (4.3)
ujL(n(p)) = (1− ψ)[1− σL(1− µh)xJ(p)]uL(p), p ∈ T (p0) (4.4)
Employed workers are just in one group. For occupation j, belief is p ∈ T (p0). Outflow
is worker who dies or separated. Inflow is worker who find a job among searchers:
[ψ + (1− ψ)δj ]ejH(φ(p)) = [(1− ψ)σHµjxJ(p)]uH(p), p ∈ T (p0) (4.5)
{ψ + (1− ψ)δj}ejL(φ(p)) = [(1− ψ)σL(1− µj)xJ(p)]uL(p), p ∈ T (p0) (4.6)
The stationary distribution is determined by (4.1)(4.6) and with the requirement that
the total measure of workers is one. Because the equilibrium is block recursive, optimal
choices are independent of the distribution, and so (4.1)(4.6) are linear equations of the
measures of workers. It is straightforward to solve for these equations by going through
the nodes of the tree, starting at the root, p0. Given the equilibrium tree of beliefs,
T (p0), the stationary distribution of workers over such beliefs is unique.
In this unique stationary distribution we will call depth of any node as age since
it takes a newborn that many ‘time periods’ to come to that node. Moreover, for an
employed worker, we will call tenure as the difference between his age and depth of
the node he is unemployed for the last time since he was working for that many ‘time
periods’ in his current job.
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4.4 Further Characterization of the equilibrium
Next two theorems will further characterize the equilibrium of the model as displaced
workers with longer previous job tenure need longer time (on average) to find the job
and they have higher probability to change occupations. However, we need a couple
of propositions and corollaries in order to make the setup for the theorems and break
down the proof of the final theorems much tractable. Next proposition simply states
that search is informative. If you search, you learn better about your true type.
Proposition 4. (Search provide information to workers about their types) Let any node
τ on the tree T . Those workers who search for the job got beliefs no worse (in the sense
that on average their beliefs are not farther away from their true types) than the workers
who did not search and stay employed. In fact, if that node is a node of employment
workers who search for the job (who got hit by external displacement shock δ) have
strictly better beliefs (in the sense that on average their beliefs are not farther away
from their true types) than the workers who stayed employed.
Proof. Let any node τ at depth S on the tree T be given. Note that by external die
probability ψ infinite life is probability zero event therefore depth is finite and it has a
positive measure of workers. Law of large numbers hold at any node therefore it will
not be referred on the rest of the proof.
By construction every worker on τ has the same belief, say Ph of being high type.
If this node is a node of unemployment, then everybody will search for a job, therefore
proposition vacuously hold.
Now, lets assume that that node is a node of employment. Let the distribution of
worker type is given as y is the fraction of high type workers. Hence 1−y is the fraction
of workers low type. I will just provide the proof that high types of workers who hit
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displacement shock and search for a job have strictly better beliefs on average than
the workers who stayed employed. For the low types proof is very similar and will be
omitted here. Note that the workers who stayed employed does not change their beliefs
of being high type, Ph. On the other hand a measure of yδ high type workers hit by
displacement shock. Lets assume that Ph > P
∗. For the case Ph ≤ P ∗ proof is very
similar and will be omitted here. Idea of the proof is simple: average improvement of
posterior beliefs of high types who search for a job in the occupation g and find a job is
bigger than the average disimprovment of posterior beliefs of high types who search for
a job in the occupation g and could not find a job. A fraction of yδx∗gµgσH will find a
job and their beliefs will be updated as
P (σh|x, g, o = 1) = σhµgx
∗Ph
σhµgx∗Ph + σl (1− µg)x∗Pl (4.7)
therefore on average posterior is
yδ
σhµgx
∗Ph
Ph +
(
σl(1−µg)x∗
σhµgx∗
)
Pl
(4.8)
A fraction of yδ(1 − x∗gµgσH) will not find a job and their beliefs will be updated
as
P (σh|xg, g, o = 0) = (1− σhµgx
∗)Ph
(1− σhµgx∗)Ph + (1− σl(1− µg)x∗)Pl
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on average their posterior is
yδ
(1− σhµgx∗)Ph
Ph +
(1−σl(1−µg)x∗)
(1−σhµgx∗) Pl
Obviously, posterior on average is closer to 1 since
σl(1− µg)x∗g
σhµgx∗g
< 1 <
(
1− σl(1− µg)x∗g
)(
1− σhµgx∗g
)
Corollary 5. Take two same type workers at age n + k which have the same history
up until stage n, where n and k are positive integers. The worker who have longer
unemployment spell during stage n+ 1 to n+ k has weakly better belief on average.
Idea of the proof of the corollary is simple. Please note that by construction of
the model, employment spells do not change beliefs of the type. Corollary simply
follows from the fact that only change of the beliefs occurs by search and the previous
proposition states that search on average improve the beliefs.
Corollary 6. Take two same type workers at age n + k which have the same history
up until stage n, where n and k are positive integers. The worker who have longer
unemployment spell during stage n + 1 to n + k is weakly more probable to be on the
correct side of the threshold P ∗ (side of the threshold which is closer to his true type)
than the worker who have shorter unemployment spell.
This corollary follows immediately from the previous corollary and stated just for
the theorem 12 below.
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Corollary 7. Take two same type workers at the stage n + k which have the same
history up until stage n, where n and k are positive integers. Assume worker 1 has
a tenure of k period and the other worker has a tenure strictly shorter than k period.
Worker with the shorter tenure has weakly better belief on average.
Corollary 8. Take two same type workers at the stage n+k which have the same history
up until stage n, where n and k are positive integers. Assume worker 1 has a tenure of
k period and the other worker has a tenure strictly shorter than k period. Worker with
the shorter tenure is weakly more probable to be on the correct side of the threshold P ∗
(side of the threshold which is closer to his true type) than the worker who have shorter
unemployment spell. .
This corollary follows immediately from the previous corollary and stated just for
the theorem 12 below.
Next proposition states for the same type of workers the farther away a workers
belief is from his true type, the longer he will search for a job on average.
Proposition 9. (Farther away the belief, longer the ue duration) Compare two high
[low] type unemployed workers such that worker 1 has better belief P1 than worker 2
with belief P2, i.e. P1 > P2 [i.e. P1 < P2]. Expected time to find a job is weakly longer
for worker 2.
Proof. I will prove here the case of two high type workers. Other case is very similar.
If they had always searched for a job in the same occupation, their expected time to
find a job would have been the same since these workers are same type. The problem is
their belief of being high type might turned out to be so low that (PH < P
∗ they began
to search in the not suitable occupation, occupation b. By construction it is obvious
that if high type searches job in occupation b it takes longer him to find a job because
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of matching probabilities. The case of P1 > P
∗ > P2 is trivial and will be omitted here.
I will prove here the case P1 > P2 > P
∗, the case P ∗ > P1 > P2 is very similar. For
the case P1 > P2 > P
∗, by induction I will show that for the same history Worker 1
is never the one whose beliefs drop below the P ∗ first. As the first step of induction it
is obvious that if both workers have not find the job on occupation-g, their belief has
relation
1
1 +
1−σl(1−µj)x
1−σhµjx
Pl
P1
>
1
1 +
1−σl(1−µj)x
1−σhµjx
Pl
P2
(4.9)
Assume that they could not find the job for k step in occupation-g and the prior
beliefs are P1k > P2k. Now the posteriors, i.e. prior beliefs for the step k + 1 are
1
1 +
1−σl(1−µj)x
1−σhµjx
Pl
P1k
>
1
1 +
1−σl(1−µj)x
1−σhµjx
Pl
P2k
. (4.10)
Therefore, the first worker is never the one whose beliefs to drop below the threshold
first.
Proposition 9 together with Corollary 7 proves the following theorem which states
exactly the first fact stated in the abstract 1)longer tenured workers on their previous
job stays unemployed longer.
Theorem 10. Take two same type workers at the stage n+k which have the same history
up until stage n, where n and k are positive integers. Assume worker 1 has a tenure
of k period and worker 2 has a tenure strictly shorter than k period. If both workers
are separated from their current job at stage n+k, worker with the shorter tenure stays
unemployed weakly shorter on average.
Proposition 11. Take two same type workers with symmetric beliefs to the threshold,
i.e. there is a γ ∈ (0,minP ∗, 1− P ∗) where worker 1 has belief of being high type of
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P ∗ + γ whereas worker 2 has belief of being high type of P ∗ − γ. Worker with priors on
the other side of threshold than his true type changes occupations they apply for more
often on average than the worker with priors on the side of the threshold which is closer
to his true type.
Proof. In appendix
Proof of this proposition is in appendix but the idea of the proof is simple and
helpful to understand the mechanism in the model. If a worker’s belief is on the side
which is closer to his true type, he will matched more often because by construction of
the matching rates. On the other hand, if the belief is on the wrong side of threshold,
more often he will not get a productive match and he will update beliefs towards to
correct side of the threshold. After a while on average, worker with the worse beliefs
will understand they are looking for the wrong occupation and change the type of the
occupation they apply.
Now with Corollary 8 and Proposition 11 we can state the following theorem which
is in terms with the second fact stated in the abstract 2)displaced workers with longer
previous job tenure changes occupation more often.
Theorem 12. Take two same type workers at the stage n+k which have the same history
up until stage n, where n and k are positive integers. Assume worker 1 has a tenure
of k period and worker 2 has a tenure strictly shorter than k period. If both workers
are separated from their current job at stage n+k, worker with the longer tenure on his
previous job changes occupation more often.
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Table 4.1: After 2008, more long tenured workers are displaced than historical average
Previous tenure
Time Period Short (≤ 8 yrs) Long (≥ 9 yrs)
Before 2008 81% 19%
After 2008 78% 22%
During 2001 crisis 81.3% 18.7%
4.5 Mismatch and Shifts in the Beveridge Curve
In this setup, it is easy to understand when a shift in Beveridge curve may occur. In
stationary distribution, it is obvious that a relation between vacancy and unemployment
rates as in Beveridge Curve exists in this setup (It is simply the property of random
matching with a matching function as stated in Assumption I). If for some reason sep-
aration shocks hits longer tenured workers and shorter tenured workers asymmetrically
such that there is a higher fraction of workers with longer tenure on their previous job in
unemployed pool than in previous equilibrium, from theorem 10 we know that expected
time of being unemployment will increase. This will happen endogenously in our setup
without any change in matching process because now ‘inexperienced in searching’ or
‘fish out of water’ workers are looking for a job and it will take them longer to ‘learn’
labor market. In fact, the following table suggests that 2008 recession is such a process
where a higher fraction of longer tenured workers are displaced, which was not the case
for e.g. 2001 recession.
As can be seen in Table 4.1, after 2008 there is an increase of 3 percentage point
of fraction of longer tenured workers in the total pool of displaced worker. During the
previous recession, on the other hand, this fraction is very close to historical average.
Table 4.1 is suggesting that ‘inexperienced in search’ workers might be a reason for the
shift in the Beveridge Curve and gives one possible explanation for the fact 3) stated in
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the abstract.
4.6 Discouraged workers
In the current setup there is no cost for search; therefore workers always search. How-
ever, if we add (utility) cost of searching to analysis, then some of the workers with very
low beliefs may chose not to search on occupation b (given that prospects of working
on occupation b is low enough compared to utility cost of search) but stay out of labor
force. In the literature those type of workers are called as discouraged workers. Our
setup with Assumption II is convenient for understanding this phenomena. Let k be the
cost of search in terms of utility for the worker if he/she choose to search. Then a sep-
arated worker with belief PH will have three choices in terms of occupational selection:
not search, search in occupation b and search in occupation g.
His new value function will be
(1 + r)V (PH) = max
{
b,maxj
{
b− k + (1− ψ) (Cjx+Dj)
[
1
Aj
W (x, j)
1− ψ (4.11)
+
δj
Aj
V
(
P (h|x, j, o = 1)
)]
+
δj
Aj
V (Ph|x, j, o = 1)
}}
If we statethe following assumption,
Assumption IV:(Search is too costly compared to prospect of finding a job or b is
latent occupation) In equilibrium if
k > (1− ψ)
[
Cbx
1
Ab
yb − cAλb/x
1− ψ +
(
1− Cbx+ δb
Ab
)
b
]
(4.12)
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Under assumption IV, Workers will choose no-searching at all rather than searching
for a job in occupation b. Derivation of this condition is in Appendix. Under (4.12),
the value function will be
(1 + r)V (Ph) = max {b, b− k + (1− ψ)R(Ph, x; g)} (4.13)
Theorem 13. Let assumption I,II is satisfied. Under assumption IV, occupation b
is latent in the sense that no workers apply a job in occupation b and no firms post
vacancy in occupation b in equilibrium. There exists P dh ∈ [0, 1] such that all people with
belief Ph < P
d
h chose not to search (stay out of labor force) and all people with a belief
Ph > P
d
h choses to search in occupation g. Value function V (θ) is (weakly) convex on
[0, 1], constant on [0, P dh ] and strictly increasing on [P
d
h , 1].
Proof. Proof is very similar to Theorem 2. Note that first component of max operator
in (4.13) is constant, whereas second component is strictly increasing as stated in proof
of Theorem 2. Therefore all the claims follow. Under assumption IV searching for a job
in occupation b is dominated by staying unemployed (actually here staying out of labor
force since in this setting if people ever choose to not search they will also choose not
search in the future given that their belief do not change).
Note that workers, who fail to find a job for enough successive number of periods,
will update their beliefs so low that it is not beneficial for them to search for a job any
longer. Therefore, actually they want to find a job but they are discouraged enough to
bother search for a job. In this setting, these workers whose beliefs are in [0, P dh ] are
discouraged workers.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this paper, we have used a competitive search model with learning through search to
analyze equilibrium effects of workers’ incomplete information on their types. Workers
are heterogeneous in their abilities and jobs are differentiated in terms of their match
rates for certain types. Characterization under certain assumptions resulted in a value
function with reservation prior property. Once a worker’s belief about his/her abilities
are below a certain level he/she always search for an occupation with a lower productiv-
ity and a lower wage rate. However, if the worker’s belief about his ability is higher than
a certain level, he/she tries his chances by searching for a job with a higher productivity-
higher wage rate occupation. It is discussed that our model can qualitatively explain
certain peculiarities in the both micro and macro data.
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Appendix A
Appendices
A.1 Data analysis
Displaced worker supplement is conducted every two years in Januaries, which asks
additional questions to the displaced workers. Technical documentation and related
documents can be seen from http://www.census.gov/cps/methodology/techdocs.html .
Related data can be downloaded from http://www.census.gov/cps/data/ .
Displaced workers in this supplement are those who involuntarily separated from
their jobs during the past three years before survey date by (i) mass layoff, (ii) plant
closure or (iii) abolishment of their position rather than because of individual job perfor-
mance. Therefore supplement data has its own limitations: First, workers are surveyed
just once, providing information on one post-displacement data, rather than about their
full history of experiences over time. So it is not possible to obtain panel data from this
survey. Second, it does not include all unemployment pool but only displaced workers;
hence, voluntary quits and fires by case are not sampled. Third, not the Displaced
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worker supplement but CPS March supplement data is criticized by Kambourov and
Manovskii (2013) for the followings:
1. Coding error of coder
2. Imputing system of CPS
3. It measures mobility not in a year but for shorter period.
Most of these criticism by Kambourov and Manovskii (2013) is relevant to March CPS
supplement and if you use panel and try to impute transitions from different groups of
employment and unemployment pools. This study is using January supplement and it
does not try to impute transitions or panel data. Kambourov and Manovskii (2013)
critique is not directly related to this study. Nevertheless, it has been taken as a cau-
tionary note.
Displaced worker supplement also has one main advantage; it is a huge survey of
around 150,000 individuals who are weighted to represent US workforce. Moreover, it
takes a specific group ‘displaced workers’ from the unemployment pool. At first this
may appear as a disadvantage. However, note that self-selection bias problem of the
data is less pronounced among displaced workers. Among the whole unemployment pool
there would be workers who self-select their tenure structure and unemployment states.
On the other hand, workers in Displaced worker supplement are those who involuntar-
ily separated from their jobs. Therefore, I believe using this supplement decreases the
self-selection issues relevant to every labor market data.
We have taken six supplements to obtain data on displaced workers from 1999 to
2012, including their demographic information, total unemployment duration, previous
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and current occupations, previous and current job tenures,and previous and current
wage rates etc. For occupations following two digit occupation codes of CPS classifica-
tion has been chosen:
1. Management occupations
2. Business and financial operations occupations
3. Computer and mathematical science occupations
4. Architecture and engineering occupations
5. Life, physical, and social science occupations 6 Community and social service
occupations
6. Legal occupations
7. Education, training, and library occupations
8. Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations
9. Healthcare practitioner and technical occupations
10. Healthcare support occupations
11. Protective service occupations
12. Food preparation and serving related occupations
13. Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance occupations
14. Personal care and service occupations
15. Sales and related occupations
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16. Office and administrative support occupations
17. Farming, fishing, and forestry occupations
18. Construction and extraction occupations
19. Installation, maintenance, and repair occupations
20. Production occupations
21. Transportation and material moving occupations
22. Armed Forces
Change in occupation means that if displaced worker is reemployed, his/her new oc-
cupation is different than his previous occupation in two digit codes. Long tenure means
that the displaced worker has worked for 8 years or more in his/her previous job before
displacement. Short tenure means that he has worked 7 years or less in his/her previous
job before displacement. Long (short) unemployment duration means that it takes more
(strictly less) than 18 weeks to find a new job. Arranged displacements are disregarded,
i.e. workers who did not stayed unemployed after displacement but immediately found
job are taken as arranged displacement and did not included in the dataset. Summary
statistics in Table 1 are for displaced workers who are male, white, aged between 35 and
45, having educational attainment of at least high school, and having same eligibility
for unemployment insurance. There are around 3,100 observations in this group. Not
all the workers have all relevant data like previous and/or current wage rates. The table
includes observations whenever relevant data exists. We have also looked at the other
group of employees with respect to other demographic and educational characteristics.
The statistics are not changing qualitatively. We have also done robustness check on the
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specification of long and short durations of tenures and its cut-off points. Results only
change qualitatively if the cut-off points decreases to 1 year but there is small sample
size (157 among 3100) under 1 year of tenure groups. We have also done robustness
check on the specification of long and short durations of unemployment and its cut-off
points. Again, the results do not change qualitatively. We tried to control for industries
and occupations but small sample sizes directs us away from that approach.
A.2 Some Proofs and Derivation of Conditions
Assumption III states that parameters of the model are such that reservation wage of
the workers are always met. In other words, workers will apply for the jobs only if
they will accept the job offer if a match occurs. This assumption mainly done because
we want to focus on unemployment process caused by learning process of the workers
rather than the well known issue of unemployment caused by not meeting reservation
wage of workers. On the other hand, it also drops one particular channel in learning
models: apply for a job for just for the sake of experimentation. In other words workers
apply for a job knowing that they will not accept the job if a match occurs but apply
for use only the information content of whether a match occurs or not. This is more
relevant learning models in other context, it may be less relevant for labor market as
stated in Gonzalez and Shi (2010). For example, in practice it is unlikely that workers
who target a management job apply for a job for experimentation in e.g. a barber’s shop
in order to understand whether they would get a management job or not. Condition in
Assumption III can be derived by
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Je
(
P (h|x, j, o = 1),W (x, j) , j
)
> V
(
P (h|x, j, o = 1)
)
for all Ph ∈ [0, 1] and j ∈ {g, b} (A.1)
Using definition of Je from equation (3.7), this condition is equivalent to
W (x, j) > (r + ψ)V
(
P (h|x, j, o = 1)
)
for all Ph ∈ [0, 1], x ∈ X and j ∈ {g, b} (A.2)
Since equilibrium wage is
W (x, j) = yj − cAjλ (x) /x (A.3)
and V
(
P (h|x, g, o = 1) ≥ V
(
P (h|x, b, o = 1), after some algebra condition in Assump-
tion III follows.
Condition in Assumption IV is obtained by a similar method. In order to occupation
b to be latent, note that from value function stated in equation (4.12), second argument
for occupation b which is
b− k + (1− ψ) (Cbx+Db)
[
1
Ab
W (x, j)
1− ψ (A.4)
+
δj
Ab
V
(
P (h|x, b, o = 1)
)]
+
δj
Aj
V (Ph|x, b, o = 1)
should be lower than pure unemployment benefit b. Using similar algebra as in Assump-
tion III condition, this is equivalent to condition stated in Assumption IV.
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Idea of the proof of Corollary 7 and 11
As in Figure A.1, the displaced worker with longer tenure on his previous job has
shorter time period in his lifespan in order to search on average compared to the dis-
placed worker with shorter tenure on his previous job. Therefore he is less experienced
in searching and therefore has worse belief on average. This makes him more probable
to search for a job for longer period and change occupation he is looking for a job more
often, on average.
Figure A.1: Two same age displaced workers with different previous job tenure
